29 February 1972

MEMORANDUM

#### Evaluation of Enemy VCI by Province in South Vietnam

1. In evaluating enemy VCI province by province in South Vietnam, one basic distinction is very important. Generally, the VCI remains much stronger in the traditional areas of enemy influence in northern South Vietnam than in the southern portion of the country. Rating of the VCI by individual provinces, to be more realistic, should be done in groups of provinces rather than by individual provinces. (There is no order of priority within the groups themselves.) Our groupings of these (GVN) provinces from strongest (from the enemy's perspective) to weakest follows:\*

First -- Quang Nam Binh Dinh

Second -- Quang Ngai
Phu Yen
Portions of GVN Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh
Provinces (Subregion 1 by VC organization)
abutting War Zone C.
Portions of Long Khanh Province (those abutting War Zone D).

Third -- Kien Hoa Vinh Binh An Xuyen

Fourth -- Chuong Thien
Kien Giang
Dinh Tuong
Quang Tin

<sup>\*</sup> It is difficult to evaluate the VCI in the highlands province of Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac.

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Fifth -- Khanh Hoa Binh Thuan Ninh Thuan

Sixth -- Rest of GVN provinces

- 2. In focusing GVN police operations it may be advisable also to consider factors other than the sole one of VCI strength and tenacity. For example:
- (a) It may be important for the GVN to attempt to make it more difficult for the enemy to send sizeable Main Force combat units back into War Zones C and D northwest and northeast of Saigon by concentrating efforts against the VCI in that region.
- (b) Conversely, for the GVN to attempt to press police work -- in the face of great needs elsewhere -- in places in South Vietnam where the enemy's infrastructure now is greatly reduced in size and largely ineffective does not appear advisable. Examples of such places are Go Cong, Vinh Long, Phong Dinh, southern Long An.
- (c) Finally, it seems important that the VCI be hurt more in a few strategic provinces -- for example Quang Tri and Thuax Tien -- than in other provinces with stronger VCI but of lesser strategic importance.

OER/I/SV

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2 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Enemy VCI by Province in South

Vietnam

The attached memorandum fulfills an informal request from SAVA, for a rating of the relative strength of enemy VCI by provinces in South Vietnam, for his purposes of reviewing Government of South Vietnam police operations.

Attachment

25X1 Distribution:

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
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